:: Volume 4, Issue 11 (9-2015) ::
mieaoi 2015, 4(11): 37-52 Back to browse issues page
Investigate the moral hazard when hoarding happen and analysis it by game Theory
Abstract:   (8423 Views)
Abstract Islamic economic system, considers market as one of the main institutions where transactions are carried out. The freedom of entry and exit, the existence of clear information, lack of compromise (conspiracy) in price and profit increase, the lack of monopoly, and ultimately the existence of morality which is the main factor in achieving the above-mentioned characteristics are the most important features of an Islamic market. Islam has defined some limits for each of the transactions, referred to as rules, one of them is the denial of hoarding. According to this rule, any transaction which leads to a risk caused by the lack of clear information and causes moral hazard that affects the prices and thus the supply and demand for traded goods and risk of loss has been banned. In this study, using the application of game theory, the relationship between buyer and seller while hoarding, which is one of the important issues in Islamic economics is analyzed and the main purpose of the study is the unlawfulness of the type of transaction in Islam using game theory. For this analysis, we investigate a hypothetical transaction in the form of a game with asymmetric information. It can be concluded that the lack of attention to this important issue in society which is due to the moral hazard causes additional costs for individuals and reduces society utility as a whole. By solving the problem of incomplete information and clearing it, the probability of transactions with hoarding is reduced.
Keywords: Islamic economy, hoarding, moral hazard, Asymmetric information, incomplete information
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Article type: Research | Subject: General
Received: 2015/11/30 | Accepted: 2015/11/30 | Published: 2015/11/30


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Volume 4, Issue 11 (9-2015) Back to browse issues page