1- PhD Student in Islamic Economics, Department of Islamic Economics, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, University of Qom, Qom, Iran 2- Professor, Department of Islamic Economics, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, University of Qom, Qom, Iran , s.farahanifard@qom.ac.ir
Abstract: (14 Views)
Purpose: The literature on popularizing the economy rests mainly on cultural, distributive and administrative justifications and does not explain how broad participation affects the allocative efficiency of capital. This paper fills that gap with a formal model.
Methodology: The study is theoretical-analytical. Popularization in firm finance is redefined as a change in the capital-allocation decision architecture and modeled as a family of quorum architectures whose endpoints are a bank credit committee and a crowdfunding platform. Eight propositions are proved and calibrated with peer-screening data.
Findings: The optimal quorum is interior, so both endpoints are strictly dominated. A debt contract pushes the screening threshold above the social optimum, whereas a profit-and-loss-sharing contract aligns it with the social optimum. Signal correlation caps the gains from aggregation: 60 participants equal only 2.2 independent screeners; even so, the crowd architecture yields 3.57 times the welfare of the centralized one.
Conclusion: Popularization works through two margins: expanding the information frontier and correcting the operating point. The social gain comes mainly from the second, and the binding constraint is participants' informational independence.